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Abstract 
 
 
In spatial competition firms are likely to be uncertain about consumer locations when 
launching products either because of shifting demographics or of asymmetric 
information about preferences. Realistically distributions of consumer locations 
should be allowed to vary over states and need not be uniform. However, the existing 
literature models location uncertainty as an additive shock to a uniform consumer 
distribution. The additive shock restricts uncertainty to the mean of the consumers 
locations. We generalize this approach to a state space model in which a vector of 
parameters gives rise to different distributions of consumer tastes in different states, 
allowing other moments (besides the mean) of the consumer distribution to be 
uncertain. We illustrate our model with an asymmetric consumer distribution and 
obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with an explicit, closed-form solution. 
An equilibrium existence result is then given for the general case. For symmetric 
distributions, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the general case can be 
described by a simple closed-form solution. 
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1 Introduction
The Hotelling model of spatial competition can be thought of as one of the
earliest problems in information economics: firms make strategic choices (lo-
cations/characteristics and prices) without knowing an individual consumer’s
type or location. However, in typical formulations, common knowledge of the
normal or uniform distribution of consumer types gives rise to the familiar mill
price equilibrium. Since individual consumer types are not observed in the stan-
dard model the assumption that the distribution of types is observable seems
internally inconsistent. Furthermore casual empiricism indicates that firms are
often less than perfectly informed about consumer tastes and frequently exert
considerable effort to generate market research data.1
Uncertainty about the population of consumers and their tastes arise natu-
rally due to rural-urban drift, migration (both local and international), births
and deaths, imperfect information dissemination and the obvious swings of fash-
ion. In order to more accurately reflect market reality, the recent demand loca-
tion uncertainty literature recasts the Hotelling model in a more general setting
in which firms are uncertain not only about the type of an individual but are
also uncertain about the distribution of consumer types.
The existing approaches to preference/demand location uncertainty focus on
the restrictive case of an additive shock to consumer types. Early approaches
to characteristic preference uncertainty, such as De Palma et al. (1985), used
the law of large numbers to generate certain demand functions from individ-
ual preferences with idiosyncratic shocks. More recently the demand location
uncertainty literature (Jovanovic (1981), Harter (1996), Casado-Izaga (2000)
and Meagher and Zauner (2004, 2005)) has analyzed situations with perfectly
correlated shocks which give rise to residual aggregate uncertainty.
Thus, the existing approaches generate no uncertainty at the distributional
level; intuitively, the uncertainty is only about the shift or the mean of consumer
1Data may be generated externally by market research survey, stated choice experiments
or internally from customer behavior databases or from staff interaction with customers.
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Table I: Share of urban settlements whose footprints intersect the Low Elevation
Coastal Zone (LECZ) by urban settlement size, 2000
Region <100K 100-500K 500K-1M 1-5M 5M+
Africa 9 23 39 50 40
Asia 12 24 37 45 70
Europe 17 22 37 41 58
Latin America 11 25 43 38 50
Australia and New Zealand 44 77 100 100 NA
North America 9 19 29 25 80
Small Island States 51 61 67 100 NA
World 13 24 38 44 65
Source: McGranahan, Balk, and Anderson (2007, Table 5, p.30).
locations/preferences. Furthermore, if there is aggregate uncertainty, consumers
are typically uniformly distributed. The contributions of this paper are twofold:
First, we show, by way of a coastal city example, how even simple situations
fall beyond the scope of the existing ‘additive-shock-uniform’ approach. Second,
we show how a judicious state space formulation gives an existence theorem for
very general forms of uncertainty. For example the distribution of tastes could
change shape across states and need not be from a fixed distributional type
such as the uniform or normal. In the case of symmetric distributions, the state
space approach gives simple closed form equations for equilibrium prices and
locations.
Our coastal city example, in Section 3 is a Hotelling style linear city but
with the population distributed according to a linear distribution instead of a
uniform. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of an closed-form
asymmetric distribution for consumers in the Hotelling model. In addition to
the standard characteristic space interpretation, this representation also allows
a geographic interpretation as a coastal city2 such as Chicago, New York or
Sydney. Two firms supplying the coastal city, when deciding where to locate,
are certain where the coastal boundary is but are unsure how spread out the city
will become by the time they build their facilities. In the coastal city example,
both the mean and the dispersion of the consumer distribution are uncertain.
2Coastal cities include cities on oceans as well as on large lakes.
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Figure 1: Population Density Per Square Kilometer by Distance to Coast for
Chicago 2000. Source: US Census 2000, Gazetted Census Tracts Data Set
This issue of uncertainty beyond the mean has not previously been considered
in the literature.
As Table I shows coastal cities are of considerable economic significance.
Sixty five percent of the worlds large cities (over five million inhabitants) are
coastal, with the rate even higher, eighty percent, in North America.
As the Chicago population density data in Figure 1 shows, average pop-
ulation density falls moving away from the coast. Many coastal cities share
this feature. This feature can be approximated by a linear distribution and is
suggestive of our coastal city example, as we will see in a later section.
We briefly lay out a model below to show how this class of problem can be
solved by extending location theory. We solve the more general case in Section
4 following the coastal city example in Section 3.
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2 Common Features of the Model
We present a model of aggregate location/taste uncertainty in the spirit of
Meagher and Zauner (2004). Both firms and consumers are located at points
on the real line IR. Each consumer demands either one or zero units of the
good and has sufficient income to buy one unit of the good. For a consumer
with “ideal” point/location x, the indirect utility function for consuming firm
i’s product (located at xi) at price pi is given by
V (x, xi, pi) = A− pi − τ(xi − x)2, τ > 0. (1)
There are two firms, i = 1, 2. The marginal cost of production of each firm
is constant and normalized to 0. Firms are uncertain about the distribution of
consumers but make decisions on the basis of a common prior, which we describe
below. Firms choose locations xi ∈ IR (i = 1, 2 and, without loss of generality,
x1 ≤ x2) simultaneously, observe the location of their competitor, then choose
prices simultaneously and finally the uncertainty is resolved.
This timing implies that firms’s product flexibility and price flexibility are
on a similar time scale. The major strategic thrust of modern manufacturing
techniques which have emerged in recent decades is to allow product flexibility
of small production runs so that firms can adjust the characteristics of their
output to what consumers are buying (see Roberts, 2004 and Milgrom, Qian
and Roberts, 1991). Restaurants have always been able to change menus from
day to day (think of the specials board) and manufacturers, and others, can
also be responsive is short time periods (see Thomke and von Hippel (2002)
for a discussion of Dell and other custom manufacturing by firms). While fixed
product characteristics may be an unreasonably pessimistic view of firms, in-
stantaneous adjustment has been shown to be an overly optimistic assumption
about price discovery. Under imperfect information firms have to experiment in
order to discover demand conditions and this experimentation is more complex
in a differentiated products setting (see Aghion, Espinosa and Jullien, 1993 and
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Harrington, 1995). Indeed, if the consumer population do not remain constant
in their behavior pricing cycles can emerge as in Keller and Rady (2003).
Consumers buy from the firm that gives them the highest (net) utility, hence
there exists a unique point ξ, satisfying V (ξ, x1, p1) = V (ξ, x2, p2), where con-
sumers are indifferent between buying from firm 1 or firm 2. We will take this
as the definition of ξ, which will be referred to as the indifferent consumer lo-
cation. States of the world are indexed by S, which might be a vector, with
density f(S). In each state of the world the distribution of consumer locations,
x, is given by gS(x).
3 An Asymmetric Coastal City Under Uncer-
tainty
Consider a variant of the ice cream sellers story popularly used to motivate
the Hotelling model. Two ice cream sellers must choose locations on a beach of
length 1, represented by the unit interval, and post prices before their customers
arrive for the day. Furthermore, assume this is a beach with a car park at the
left end so all consumers enter from the same end and then walk a random
distance to the right, determined jointly by their dislike of walking and crowds.
This scenario could plausibly yield an asymmetric density of consumers on the
interval [0, α], 0 < α ≤ 1.
As Figure 1 shows asymmetric densities of consumer locations are not just
confined to stories about ice cream sellers. Coastal cities are, by definition,
bounded (on at least one side) by water. Typically access to shipping through
a port played a strong role in the foundation of these coastal cities leading to
a concentration of economic activity close to the coast. As the Chicago data
shows over time the coast continues to exert a strong pull on the population.
It is of course not immediately obvious if the higher population density near
the coast is due directly to the attraction of the coast or if other agglomeration
forces have taken over.
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Table II: OLS Regression Results: Population per Square Kilometer by Distance
to Coast for Chicago 2000.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error p-value
Distance to coast -283.46 16.19 0.000
Constant 9274.35 246.31 0.000
N 1254
Adjusted R2 19.6 %
Source: US Census 2000, Gazetted Census Tracts Data Set. Distances are calculated using
the Haversin Formula for Great Circle Distances as the minimum distance from the census
tract centroids to a set of points on the coast.
Our focus is not to explain coastal population density but to observe that the
standard Hotelling style uniform assumption is not accurate for this common
situation, nor is the more recent triangle distribution model of Tabuchi and
Thisse (1995). Rather than approximate a real density with a step function,
as in Hotelling, we take the more flexible approach of linear approximation.
For example approximating the Chicago data in Figure 1 by linear regression
gives the estimates in Table II. The regression shows that population density
in Chicago decreases on average at a rate of 283.46 people/km2 per kilometer
from the coast.3
The following distribution is reminiscent of the coastal city discussed. For
simplicity we assume consumers are distributed according to the linear density:
gα(x) =


2
α
− 2x
α2
if 0 ≤ x < α
0 otherwise
Cities, and especially coastal cities in developing countries, are experiencing
rapid population growth, for example coastal urban areas in China grew on
average 3.39% per year from 1990 to 2000 (see McGranahan et al., 2007). We
believe these large population changes are not deterministic from the point of
view of firms, but they should appear as uncertainty over the distribution of
consumers in the duopoly model. To clarify what we mean by uncertainty over
3Obviously population density is also likely to be affected by other geographic features
like industrial zoning, rivers, hills, parks, urban decay etc. Indeed looking at the Chicago
map shows industrial corridors close to the coast and the Chicago river. Nonetheless the
adjusted-R2 of 19.6% is comparable to cross sectional results for many economic variables.
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the distribution reconsider the simple ice sellers story. Since the ice cream sellers
are uncertain who will come to the beach they are therefore uncertain of which
(linear) density of consumers will occur. This uncertainty about the realization
of the consumer distribution is represented here by a common prior over α,
denoted f(α) on [0, 1]. For simplicity and to yield explicit solutions we choose f
to be the power density of order 2, i.e. f(α) = 3α2 (which is also asymmetric).4
Assuming firms are risk neutral the expected profits for firm 1 are
E[Π1(p1, p2, x1, x2)] =
∫ 1
0
∫ ξ
0
p1gα(x)f(α)dxdα (2)
=
∫ ξ
0
(
p1
∫ x
0
0dα+ p1
∫ 1
x
(
2
α
− 2x
α2
)
3α2dα
)
dx(3)
= p1
[
x3 − 3x2 + 3x]ξ
0
(4)
= p1(ξ
3 − 3ξ2 + 3ξ) (5)
and similarly for firm 2
E[Π2(p2, p2, x1, x2)] = p2
[
x3 − 3x2 + 3x]1
ξ
(6)
= p2(1− (ξ3 − 3ξ2 + 3ξ)) (7)
This problem is quite different from those considered previously in the liter-
ature. Clearly, it is not just the mean of the consumer distribution that varies
with the uncertainty.
As the following proposition shows, this problem does in fact give rise to a
unique equilibrium.
4Choosing distributions which yield closed form solutions is extremely difficult for this
problem. First, forming an expectation about demand is similar to the conjugate priors
problem of Bayesian statistics which has only a few known solutions. In addition, the posterior
from the conjugate priors must satisfy the Anderson et al. (1997) log-concavity type conditions
for a location-price equilibrium which also has a relatively small number of closed formed
solutions (see Meagher et al., 2008).
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Proposition 1 The coastal city problem under uncertainty has a unique sub-
game perfect location-then-price equilibrium given by
x∗1 = 1−
17
24
3
√
2 ≈ 0.1076
x∗2 = 1 +
3
8
3
√
2 ≈ 1.4725
p∗1 = τ
13
12
3
√
22 ≈ 1.7197τ
p∗2 =
τ
3
13
12
3
√
22 ≈ 0.5732τ
ξ∗ = −1
2
3
√
2 + 1 ≈ 0.3700
Proof: See appendix. 2
The obvious way to establish this proposition is by working directly with
the specified payoff functions and their derivatives. Naturally one wonders if
there are more general economic forces at work and if a more general result is
possible. As the next section shows the appropriate formulation of the problem
yields a very general existence result.
As one might expect the equilibrium locations and prices are asymmetric
for the coastal cities model due to the asymmetric distributions. Specifically,
firm 1 has expected demand of 0.7400, while firm 2 only has 0.2500, resulting in
equilibrium expected profits of 1.2897 and 0.1433 for firms 1 and 2 respectively.
Thus firm 2, the firm on the periphery, has prices one third the level of firm 1.
These low prices plus low consumer density lead to profit for the coastal firm 1
being nine times higher than for the peripheral firm. These results are in strong
contrast with the symmetric results produced from most models, in particular
those with uniform distributions. In contrast to the asymmetric equilibrium of
Tabuchi and Thisee (1995), the equilibrium here is unique.
Now, we turn to a more general version of this problem.
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4 General State Space Results
Consider the more general setting in which the distribution of consumers over
locations, x, conditional on the value of a vector of parameters M is given by
g(x|M). The marginal density of M , that is, the uncertainty distribution, is
given by f(M) with support S. Without loss of generality assume E[M ] = 0.
We analyze the pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game.
Given the above assumptions the consumer-cum-uncertainty distribution of con-
sumers, h(x), is given by:
h(x) =
∫
S
g(x|M)f(M)dM. (8)
For the following proposition it is useful to define
J(x) ≡ H(x)(1 −H(x))
h(x)
, (9)
where H(·) is the distribution function associated with the density function h(·).
The following proposition shows the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
in the general case.
Proposition 2 Assume that the consumer-cum-uncertainty distribution h(·) is
log-concave with mean 0 and support [a, b]. If J(x) is strictly pseudo-concave
and limx→a J(x) = limx→b J(x) then there exists a unique subgame perfect equi-
librium in the location-then-price game with uncertainty.
Proof: The proof establishes the equivalence of our game to another spatial
game with a known solution.
Prices are state independent thus for a fixed M firm i’s profit, pii, is pii =
piQi, i = 1, 2, where Qi is the demand for firm i. Since firms are risk neutral
their payoffs are given by the expectation overM of the state contingent profits.
Locations are also state independent implying ξ is independent of M . Hence,
we have
EM [Q1(p1, p2, x1, x2,M)] =
∫
S
∫ ξ(p1,p2,x1,x2)
−∞
g(z|M)f(M)dzdM (10)
=
∫ ξ(p1,p2,x1,x2)
−∞
∫
S
g(z|M)f(M)dMdz (11)
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=∫ ξ(p1,p2,x1,x2)
−∞
h(z)dz, (12)
and a similar expression for firm 2. Thus EM [pi1] = p1H(ξ) and EM [pi2] =
p2(1−H(ξ)).
Thus, the expected payoffs and strategies for each firm are the same as in
a standard certainty location game with a consumer distribution given by h.
Since the two games are equivalent they will have the same equilibria which is
seen to be unique by a direct application of Anderson et al. (1997, Proposition
2). 2
Corollary 1 If, in addition to the conditions of Proposition 2, h(·) is symmetric
then the unique sub-game perfect location-then-price equilibrium is:
−x∗1 = x∗2 =
3
4h(0)
, (13)
p∗1 = p
∗
2 =
3τ
2h(0)2
. (14)
Proof: Proposition 2 and Anderson et al. (1997, Corollary 1). 2
If the density of consumers h(x) is symmetric and neither too concave nor
too convex, there is a unique equilibrium in which the prices and the locations
depend only upon the density of the distribution at its mean. The standard
spatial competition model uses a continuum of consumers to aggregate out the
individual level uncertainty about consumer locations from firm profit functions.
Under our state space approach firms know less: firms must still make their
strategic decisions without knowing the locations of individual consumers but
in addition they are uncertain about the distribution of consumers as well.
However, because all decisions are made prior to the resolution of either source
of uncertainty all that matters from the perspective of a firm is the combined
effect of both forms of uncertainty on the density of consumers (at the marginal
location).
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5 Conclusion
We have argued that spatial competition theory should be extended to include
uncertainty over the distribution of consumers, that the theory should allow
for non-uniform consumer distributions and that these distributions should be
allowed to vary in shape (mean, dispersion, support etc) over states of the world.
We tackled all these issues in a setting where the adjustment of prices and
product characteristics/locations occurs over a similar time frame to changes in
the underlying distribution of consumer locations/tastes.
The coastal city model describes an asymmetric setting in which a linear
consumer distribution is random, that is, the realized uncertainty determines
which linear consumer distribution occurs. We showed that this situation has a
unique duopoly equilibrium which, as one would expect, is quite different from
the results of the standard uniform models.
For the general case we identified conditions on the joint density which yield
a unique duopoly equilibrium. These conditions are relatively easy to test and
could be employed in the numerical analysis of real data. For the case of sym-
metric densities we identified a closed form solution in which firms locate sym-
metrically. In the symmetric case equilibrium prices and locations depend on
the density of the joint distribution at the mean, thus an increase in uncertainty,
as expressed by a mean preserving spread of the joint distribution, would yield
higher prices, greater differentiation and higher profits.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
From Proposition 2 for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium it suf-
fices to show that h is log concave and that J is strictly pseudo concave with
symmetric limits for its tails. First calculating h:
h(x) =
∫ 1
x
(
2
α
− 2x
α2
)
3α2dα (15)
12
= 3x2 − 6x+ 3 (16)
and
H(x) = x3 − 3x2 + 3x (17)
Hence
∂2ln(3x2 − 6x+ 3)
∂x2
= − 2
(x− 1)2 . (18)
Which establishes log concavity.
Now for the coastal city problem it can be shown that
J(x) =
H(x)(1 −H(x))
h(x)
(19)
=
(x3 − 3x2 + 3x)(1 − (x3 − 3x2 + 3x))
3x2 − 6x+ 3 (20)
= −x(x − 1)(x2 − 3x+ 3)/3 (21)
Since this function is continuous the limits can be found by simple substitution
J(0) = 0 = J(1). (22)
Finally strict pseudo concavity is easily established since the J function in
this case is in fact concave:
∂2(−x(x− 1)(x2 − 3x+ 3)/3)
∂x2
= −4(x− 1)2 < 0 (23)
Having established existence and uniqueness we need only solve the system
of first order conditions to find the equilibrium values for locations and prices:
h′(ξ∗) =
[
1
H(ξ∗)
− 1
1−H(ξ∗)
]
h(ξ∗)2 (24)
x∗1 = ξ
∗ − 1−H(ξ
∗)
h(ξ∗)
(2−H(ξ∗)) (25)
x∗2 = ξ
∗ +
H(ξ∗)
h(ξ∗)
(1 +H(ξ∗)) (26)
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p∗1 = 4τ
H(ξ∗)
h(ξ∗)2
(1−H(ξ∗) +H(ξ∗)2) (27)
p∗2 = 4τ
1−H(ξ∗)
h(ξ∗)2
(1−H(ξ∗) +H(ξ∗)2). (28)
Solving for ξ∗ gives the cubic equation:
4(ξ∗)3 − 12(ξ∗)2 + 12(ξ∗)− 3 = 0. (29)
This yields only one real root (which is the value of interest)
ξ∗ = −1
2
3
√
2 + 1.
The other results follow immediately by substitution. QED
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